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BLAMING AS A SOCIAL PROCESS: THE INFLUENCE OF CHARACTER AND MORAL 









For the most part, the law eschews the role of moral character in legal blame. But when 
we observe an actor who causes harm, legal and psychological blame processes are in tension. 
Procedures for legal blame assume an assessment of the actor’s mental state, and ultimately of 
responsibility, that is independent of the moral character of the actor. In this paper, I present 
experimental evidence to suggest that perceptions of intent, foreseeability, and possibly 
causation can be colored by independent reasons for thinking the actor is a bad person, and are 
mediated by the experience of negative moral emotion. Our emotional reactions are not only a 
product of the act and the outcome, but also a product of inferences about the general 
virtuousness of the person who performed the act that caused the harm. Remarkably, this result 
holds true even though the mental state of the actor was clearly specified. As observers, we give 
the benefit of the doubt to a person with a virtuous character who causes harm; we perceive his 
actions as less intentional and perhaps even less causal, and the harm less foreseeable than if his 
character is flawed. Remarkably, it seems that we do not deliberately use character information 
to inform responsibility judgments, for when differences in character are made explicit, we 





When we assign blame for something bad that happened, we are doing something 
social—we are identifying another human being who caused harm, without justification or 
excuse. A window broken by a hurricane elicits a story about cause, but not a story about blame; 
a window broken by a person elicits blame attribution. Once a human agent is identified, we 
naturally turn our attention to blame severity, a complex judgment shaped by several different 
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concerns. A window broken by a child’s stray baseball is assessed differently from a window 
broken by a vandal, or by a burglar, or by a white supremacist. Assessing blame involves not 
only determining the badness of the harm (for example, property damage versus injured person), 
but also the badness of the actor’s mental state (for example, accident versus intentional), and 
perhaps even the badness of the actor’s motive (for example, general destructiveness versus 
racial hatred). When viewed this way, we see that blame, -- as a psychological matter -- involves 
attributions about other people and the extent to which they intend to harm us or otherwise pose 
a threat to the social order. In this sense, blaming is social because it is about attributions of other 
people and their intentions. 
The law takes account of each of the blame dimensions just mentioned. The criminal law 
reserves more severe offense categories for more severe harm. It imposes more serious liability 
when mens rea is more culpable, all else being equal. And sometimes, as is the case with hate 
crimes, it explicitly takes into account the actor’s motive for causing harm. But there is another 
possible influence on blame not yet mentioned—an influence which the law has sought to 
minimize. The moral character of the actor, apart from that actor’s motive or reasons for acting, 
might play an important role as a descriptive matter in the psychological process of blame. Yet, 
for the most part, the law eschews the role of moral character in legal blame.1
                                                          
1 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (permitting admission of evidence of the defendant’s bad character only when it is 
used in specific rebuttal to evidence of good character submitted by the defense). By contrast, the criminal law 
embraces the consideration of the defendant’s character in sentencing judgments. For example, the U.S. Code 
provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct 
of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of 
imposing an appropriate sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006). In practice, the Presentence Investigation Report “may 
contain a wide range of information about the defendant, all of which may be considered by the court in determining 
the sentence.” Sentencing Guidelines, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 681, 725 n. 2161 (2009). For a 
dissenting view, see Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the 
Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019 (2003). The focus in this article 
is primarily on blame, rather than punishment judgments. 
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In a previous article, we explored empirically the question of motive for acting, and how 
it produces inferences about moral character that influence blame judgments.2
The findings reported here echo research examining criminal cases suggesting that the 
defendant’s prior criminal record can influence jury verdicts. For example, in cases where 
evidence is weak, there is a positive correlation between the jury learning that the defendant had 
committed prior crimes and the likelihood of conviction.
 By contrast, the 
first overarching goal of the current article is to provide experimental evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that psychological blame is influenced by perceptions of the actor’s overall virtue or 
lack thereof, even apart from the actor’s reason for acting in the specific instance. This article 
marshals experimental evidence to support the idea that a person with a flawed moral character is 
blamed more for causing harm than a person who is otherwise virtuous. Thus, we are likely to 
blame more severely a drug-addicted high school dropout who knocks down ten rural mailboxes 
with a baseball bat than an A-student who is on the chess team who engages in the same action. 
Similarly, we are likely to blame more severely an abusive parent who drives recklessly and 
unintentionally hits a pedestrian than a model parent who performs the same act with the same 
mens rea. The experiment reported here implements a rigorous test of this hypothesis and shows 
that even mildly unpleasant character traits, such as unreliability, can lead observers to blame 
more harshly, and to bolster these harsh blame judgments with increased perceptions of the 
actor’s causal role and his intent to cause harm.  
3
                                                          
2 Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).  
 This suggests that in the absence of 
compelling evidence tending to prove guilt, juries sometimes use the fact that the defendant had 
committed prior crimes as a reason to think he might be guilty of the crime in question. Existing 
3 See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal 
Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1388 (2009) (noting that data 
suggest that disclosure of prior crimes increases the chances of conviction in close cases). 
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experimental research also suggests that information about prior crimes can increase the 
likelihood of criminal conviction.4 These findings are important, but they focus on the narrow 
question of the influence of prior crimes on verdicts in criminal cases. By contrast, the focus of 
this article is more expansive. First, the focus here is on the influence of moral character broadly, 
not just on inferences drawn from prior crimes.5
                                                          
4 This relationship appears to be strongest when the defendant’s prior crimes were serious in nature or similar to the 
current accusation. See Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior-Record Evidence on Juror Decision 
Making, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 69 (1995) (summarizing prior research indicating that evidence of prior 
convictions affects chances of conviction, especially if “the prior conviction was for an offense similar to the one 
jurors were deciding”); Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the 
Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 237–38 (1976) (discussing potential ways that revealing a 
defendant’s criminal record might alter a verdict);Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the 
Defendant's Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 734, 753–55 (2000) (“The results 
clearly confirm that evidence of previous convictions can have a prejudicial effect, especially when there is a recent 
previous conviction for a similar offence.”); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting 
Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 42 (1985) 
(disclosure of similar prior crime increases the likelihood of conviction more than disclosure of dissimilar prior 
crime).  
 Instead of examining the effect of an 
emotionally provocative criminal violation of the social contract, such as the influence of the 
defendant’s prior armed robbery, this article focuses on subtle cues about the actor’s character 
traits, such as generosity and reliability, and shows that even mild virtue deficits lead to more 
severe blame judgments. Second, the focus of this article is on blame generally, not just on 
verdicts; it is on the basic social–psychological question of how blaming processes work, both in 
court and out of court, and both within the law and in everyday social life. To that end, rather 
than examining the influence of a person’s prior criminal record, as previous scholars have done, 
5 The mechanism by which information that the defendant committed prior crimes increases the likelihood of 
conviction is still not entirely clear. It is likely that perceivers treat prior crimes as evidence of propensity to commit 
the current offense that operates within a specific category—the idea being, for example, “once a burglar, always a 
burglar.” Support for this idea has emerged from several experiments, which demonstrate that mock jurors are more 
likely to convict when the defendant’s prior crimes are similar to the current offense, compared to when the prior 
crimes are dissimilar to the current offense. See, e.g., Wissler & Saks, supra note 4, at 43 (“[T]he highest conviction 
rate occurred when the prior conviction was the same as the present charge.”). It is also possible that the positive 
correlation between prior crimes and likelihood of conviction is partially accounted for by credibility concerns—a 
testifying defendant who is impeached with evidence that he committed prior crimes involving deceit may be more 
likely to be convicted. Additionally, part of the variance might be accounted for by jurors’ inferences about the 
defendant’s dangerousness, which is arguably another version of the propensity thesis, in which the propensity 
inference is made across the broad category of violent acts. The important point here, however, is that none of these 
explanations for the association between prior crime and likelihood of conviction is focused on the broad idea of 
moral character, which is the focus of this article. 
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I instead examine the influence of subtle cues about character, such as whether someone works 
hard or goofs off on the job.  
In addition to testing a more expansive notion of moral character, a second goal of this 
article is to explore the extent to which the influence of moral character varies with the actor’s 
mental state. For example, is a negligent actor with a bad character blamed just as much as a 
reckless actor with a good character? Mental states, after all, are often difficult to know with 
precision. A driver who kills a small child after he runs a stop sign while he is dialing his cell 
phone is reckless6 if he is conscious of and disregards the risk that someone might die; he is 
negligent7 if he was merely careless without consciously disregarding this risk.8
                                                          
6 I am assuming, for the sake of this example, recklessness as defined by the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962). 
 But it is difficult 
to glean another person’s mental state with such precision. If we think the driver might have been 
aware of the risk of death, knowing that the driver is a person of poor moral character might be 
enough to push us toward a more severe blame judgment. Conversely, knowing the driver is an 
otherwise virtuous person might pull us in the other direction, toward less severe blame. In this 
way, moral character might serve as a kind of proxy for mental state, so that a person with a bad 
character is blamed as if he were reckless, whereas a person with a good character is blamed as if 
he were not reckless. The experiment reported here tests this idea. 
7 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1962). 
8 This example appears in Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597, 600 
(2001). Ferzan explores the problematic space in between recklessness and negligence. Using the current example, 
suppose we can infer only that the driver recognized, on a very general level, that driving while dialing a cell phone 
is a dangerous thing to do, but nothing more. This state of mind -- dubbed “opaque recklessness” by Ferzan -- does 
not, strictly speaking, meet the MPC definition of recklessness because the driver did not consider and disregard the 
risk of death. According to the hypothesis discussed in the text herein, the opaquely reckless driver would be 
blamed, in part, according to available information  about his moral character. In fact, moral character information 
might have an especially strong inference when mental state is ambiguous or is located in the liminal space between 
two culpability categories, as arguably is the case with opaque recklessness.  
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A third focus of this article is moral emotion as the mechanism through which moral 
character influences blame.9 When we observe a moral violation, we often react emotionally. 
When we hear about a thug who snatches a purse from a vulnerable elderly victim, we feel 
angry. When we hear about the trauma experienced by a sexual assault survivor, we feel 
sympathy. When we learn about the sadistic murder of a child, we feel disgust. Experiencing 
moral emotions can cause us to make harsher moral judgments.10
Prior empirical research on the influence of prior conviction on legal judgments of guilt 
has focused on the “whodunit” question: Given the defendant’s prior record and other evidence 
presented, what is the probability that he committed the offense in the instant case? By contrast, 
the focus of the study presented in this article is quite different: Given that the actor undisputedly 
 The experiment reported in this 
article seeks first to establish the link between perceiving someone’s moral character and 
experiencing emotion. Specifically, the experiment tests the idea that, compared to an otherwise 
virtuous person who causes harm, an otherwise bad person who causes harm makes us feel 
angrier and more disgusted, which in turn leads to more punitive attributions of blame. These 
emotion-charged blame judgments have potentially important implications for basic social–
psychological mechanisms involving blame, and can inform our understanding of blame both 
within the legal system and outside of it in everyday social life. This process of inculpation, 
infused with emotion and driven by character inferences, can help to explain the charging 
decisions of prosecutors, the claiming decisions of injured people, the settlement behavior of 
litigants, and the punitive damages decisions of juries, among many other examples.  
                                                          
9 Moral emotions can be thought of as those emotions that are evoked by a threat to or violation of a personally 
valued moral principle. See C. D. Batson, What’s Wrong with Morality?, 3 EMOTION REVIEW 230, 233 (2011).  
10 See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and 
Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 570 (1998) 
(noting that participants that were anger-primed made more punitive attributions than other participants); Thalia 
Wheatley & Jonathan Haidt, Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 780, 780 
(2005) ("[M]oral judgments can be made more severe by the presence of a flash of disgust.").  
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performed a specific act causing a particular result, with a specifically described mental state, 
what is the marginal influence, if any, of the actor’s moral character on observers’ judgments of 
blame? Whereas earlier empirical work on prior conviction focused on the probability that the 
defendant committed the offense, the current study focuses on character-driven, emotionally 
infused blame judgments, given that the actor did cause the posited harm. The results of the 
current study suggest that perceptions of moral character and resulting moral emotions not only 
drive blame judgments but also the putatively fixed judgments of causation and intent as well. 
 
II 
MORAL CHARACTER AND BLAME 
 
Consider the following scenario:11 John was speeding to get home, driving 40 mph in a 
30 mph zone. He came to an intersection and applied the brakes but was unable to stop in time 
because of an oil spill on the road.12
a) Hide from his parents an anniversary present for them that he had left out in the open , 
OR 
 John hit another car in the intersection, injuring the other 
driver. John was speeding home in order to: 
b) Hide from his parents a vial of cocaine he had left out in the open . 
When people think about this scenario, those who learn that John was hiding cocaine think that 
he was more responsible for the accident, on average, than those who learn that John was hiding 
a present.13
                                                          
11 This scenario and results described herein are reported in Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 368, 369 (1992). 
 From the perspective of legal responsibility, this is an odd result, given that John’s 
behavior, the other driver’s behavior, and the accident scene are the same in each scenario. 
12 Alternatively, the stop sign was obscured by a large tree branch. Id. The pattern of results described below is the 
same in the oil and tree branch variations. Id. at 370. 
13 Id. 
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John’s state of mind, of course, was different—in the sense that the object that he sped home to 
hide was different. But comparing the two scenarios, John’s state of mind was not different in 
any legally relevant way. If John is liable for the accident, it is because he was negligent—he 
should have foreseen that his speeding caused a risk of harm. The foreseeability of the harm is 
the same in each scenario, as is John’s failure to exercise reasonable care.  
Besides differences in responsibility judgments, there is another oddity that emerges in 
reactions to this story. Not only do people think John is more responsible, but they also think he 
is more of the cause of the accident when the object he was thinking about hiding was cocaine, 
rather than a present.14
In light of the drug-related nature of John’s nefarious goal in the cocaine scenario, one 
might object that, in fact, people might have imagined his conduct to be different from the 
anniversary present scenario. Perhaps people thought that John was under the influence of 
cocaine at the very moment of the collision, thus making him more responsible. Or, perhaps 
John’s goal of hiding cocaine was more distracting than the goal of hiding a present, so that in 
the cocaine scenario people interpret John as having paid less attention. Or, perhaps in the 
cocaine scenario people imagined John driving faster than in the anniversary present scenario—
 From the perspective of legal causation, this also presents something of a 
puzzle. The chain of events between the accident and the injury is exactly the same in each 
scenario. The risk of colliding and injuring another person does not differ from one scenario to 
the next, and neither does John’s breach of the standard of due care. What does differ, however, 
is John’s motivation for engaging in the act that led to the collision. In the scenario involving the 
cocaine, John’s motivation for speeding was nefarious; in the scenario involving the present, 
John’s motivation for speeding was laudable (despite the fact that it does not outweigh the 
foreseeable risk of injury).  
                                                          
14 Id.  
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even though the speed was specified to be the same in both versions—so that John seemed more 
responsible and his actions more causal for those reasons. 
There is further evidence, however, supporting the hypothesis that an actor’s bad motive 
can result in harsher judgments of blame and causation for harm. In previous work,15 we 
presented people with a scenario involving a man—Sam—who stored oxygen tanks in his 
backyard shed. When a cigarette butt landed near the shed, the tanks accidentally exploded and a 
neighborhood youth was killed. Just as blame and causation judgments were harsher for John the 
driver when he had a bad motive for speeding, judgments of blame and causation in this study 
were harsher for Sam when he had a bad motive for storing oxygen tanks in his shed. 
Specifically, if Sam stored oxygen because he was a high school football coach who cheated by 
giving oxygen to his players, he was judged to be more responsible, more blameworthy, and his 
role more causal in the accidental death of the youth compared to if he stored oxygen to care for 
his sick daughter.16
In the oxygen study, it is implausible that participants perceived that there was any 
greater danger or risk of oxygen explosion in the football scenario than in the sick daughter 
scenario. Rather, it must have been Sam’s bad motive that prompted people to perceive him as 
more blameworthy, responsible, and causal in the football scenario. Perhaps, however, these 
differences in blame and perception of causation are not so anomalous, from a legal perspective. 
After all, the social value of the conduct of storing oxygen tanks to care for a sick child is greater 
than that of cheating at football. And the social value of speeding home to surprise loved ones 
 
                                                          
15 Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 2. See Keith J. Holyoak & Dan Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision 
Making by Constraint Satisfaction, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 3, 11–13 (1999) (demonstrating that 
when an investor was motivated by malicious greed, perceivers were more likely to positively assess arguments 
supporting liability for libel, compared to when he was motivated by honest concern).  
16 In a third neutral condition, the man stored oxygen for delivery as part of his home health care business. In this 
scenario, judgments of blame and causation were roughly midway between those in the football cheating scenario on 
the one hand, and the sick daughter scenario on the other. Id. 
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with a gift is greater than that of hiding illegal drugs. When the social value of conduct is 
sufficiently great, this can justify the risk that is assumed by the actor. In tort law, a reasonable 
person considers the risk of harm in light of the utility of the conduct.17
Like tort law, criminal law takes into account the extent to which the actor’s risky 
behavior was justified when assigning liability for crimes involving recklessness. The Model 
Penal Code test focuses on “the nature and purpose” of the actor’s conduct and its surrounding 
circumstances.
 Thus, a vaccine that 
carries a risk of harming 1 in 1000 children might be considered reasonable given the social 
value of the vaccine; a piece of candy that carries the same risk of harm would not.  
18
In light of the legal standards for risky conduct in tort law and criminal law, it is perhaps 
not so anomalous that in the two studies described, people would consider John the cocaine hider 
more blameworthy than John the present hider, and Sam the football cheater to be more 
blameworthy than Sam the father of the sick child. Putting to the side the issue of 
blameworthiness, it is perhaps still puzzling why people would see an actor with a bad motive 
 Depending on the nature and purpose of the conduct, the actor’s disregard of 
the associated risk might be considered consistent with the standards of a law abiding person, on 
the one hand, or a gross deviation from those standards, on the other. In the latter case, the actor 
would be deemed to have acted with a reckless state of mind. Thus, for example, a surgeon who 
disregards a substantial risk of death to the patient in performing a dangerous operation might be 
justified in doing so if the purpose of the conduct is to save the patient’s life, and there is no safer 
way to do so. On the other hand, if the purpose of the conduct is something other than saving the 
patient’s life (for example, testing a new surgical technique), it is unlikely that the risk of harm 
would be justified. 
                                                          
17 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 291 (1965). See also United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d 
Cir. 1947).  
18 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962). 
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more causal in the chain of events leading to harm. As a general matter, there is evidence that 
causal proximity influences blame judgments.19 Thus, harm that occurs by touching or other 
personal contact with the victim is judged to be less morally permissible than the same harm that 
occurs without personal contact.20 But in the cocaine–present study, and in the oxygen tank 
study, causal proximity does not seem to vary between the good motive and bad motive 
scenarios. To the contrary, in both versions of the scenario in both studies, there is really no 
question about the extent to which the actor caused the harm. In the cocaine–present study, John 
failed to stop his car at the stop sign and collided with another car. To be sure, there were other 
causal factors contributing to the accident.21
Mark Alicke’s theory of culpable control represents one attempt to explain this puzzle. 
The theory posits that when people assess blame, they try to gauge the extent to which the actor 
exercised control over the outcome.
 But under any plausible account of causal 
explanation for the harm, John’s conduct was a primary cause of the harm, and the proximity of 
his actions to the harm was the same in each version of the scenario. Similarly, in the oxygen 
tank study, Sam’s conduct was a primary cause of the harm, and the proximity of his actions to 
the harm was the same in each version of the scenario. In both studies, therefore, there seems to 
be no obvious, straightforward explanation as to why having a bad motive would transform 
conduct into a stronger cause of harm. 
22
                                                          
19 See Fiery Cushman et al., The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three 
Principles of Harm, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082, 1086 (2006) ("Subjects rated . . . harm involving physical contact as 
morally worse than harm without contact.");  
 If an actor acts intentionally and that action directly causes 
20 See Id.; Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 
SCIENCE 2105, 2105–06 (2001) (noting that most people find pushing a stranger off a bridge to be more troubling 
than flipping a switch causing a runaway trolley to hit a stranger, even though both actions resulted in five lives 
being saved). 
21 In one version of the scenario the road was slippery because of a prior oil spill; in another version, the stop sign 
was partially obscured by a tree branch. There were no notable differences in the results between these two versions 
of the scenario.  
22 Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 557 (2000).  
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the outcome, then the actor is perceived to have high control; conversely, if there is an absence 
of intent and there was a long chain of events that caused the outcome, then the actor is 
perceived to have low control. How much intent did the actor have? How strongly causal was the 
actor’s role in the harm? It is well understood that these judgments often are made under 
uncertainty.23 Alicke argues that perceptions of intent and harm are directly influenced by our 
initial affective reaction to the harm situation.24 Once strong negative reactions are evoked by 
harmful conduct, then people’s desire to blame kicks into gear, and their assessment of factors 
like foreseeability, intent, and causation is colored by their motivation to understand the conduct 
as highly blameworthy.25
                                                          
23See Alicke, supra note 11 at 368. 
 On this account, people blame early, then justify the blame assessment 
by pointing to corresponding levels of foreseeability, intent, and causation. Thus, John the 
cocaine hider evoked a strong negative reaction, leading to perceptions of high blameworthiness 
for the accident and injury, and correspondingly high perceptions of causation to justify the 
blame attribution after the fact. John the present hider evoked a reaction that was less strongly 
negative, so less extreme judgments of blame and causation followed. Similarly, on this account, 
Sam the football cheater evoked a strong negative reaction, leading to perceptions of high 
blameworthiness for the youth’s death, and correspondingly high perceptions of causation to 
justify the blame attribution; the reactions to Sam the father of the sick daughter were less 
negative. On this account we engage in “blame validation”: we make blame attributions 
24 Id. at 558. 
25 The study of motivated cognition in law has received increased attention in recent years. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, 
Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
729 (2010); Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 
64 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1755706; 
Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and 
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009); Avani Mehta Sood & John M. Darley, The 
Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Punishment Goals:  Legal Implications of Outcome-Driven Reasoning  100 
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at SSRN:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641022.  
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spontaneously according to how strongly negative our gut reaction is; then we validate our blame 
assessment by tuning evaluations of causation and intention accordingly.  
Alicke’s blame-validation model posits that we have an immediate negative reaction to 
an actor with a bad motive who caused harm, which leads to a fast, automatic initial blame 
judgment.26 This initial blame judgment then guides subsequent perceptions about the actor’s 
causal role in producing the harm. The extent to which this type of blame-early account 
accurately describes moral decision making is a matter of dispute among social psychologists 
and experimental philosophers.27 Alicke’s model is a version of a “blame early” model. By 
contrast, the blame-late models posit that once a perceiver detects a harmful event, she assesses 
causation and mental state before coming to a conclusion about blame.28
We have seen that bad motive can increase attributions of blame and causation. We have 
also seen that law takes into account motive as sometimes relevant to whether an actor is 
justified in disregarding a risk of harm. Therefore, at least with regard to blame, the law takes 
account of people’s natural inclination to blame according to the actor’s motive, even if the 
motive–causation connection is not explicitly accounted for in law. But reason for acting is only 
one example of how people’s initial evaluation of an actor might push them toward harsh 
 More research will be 
required in the future to sort out the causal order of blame and related attributions. Regardless of 
whether blame in fact comes early or late, there remains strong evidence that an actor’s bad 
motive for acting (for example, hiding drugs, cheating at football) can influence perceptions of 
causation. 
                                                          
26 Alicke, supra note 22, at 558. 
27 Compare note 25, and Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach 
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001), with Fiery Cushman, Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing 
the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment, 108 COGNITION 353 (2008), and Bertram F. Malle 
et al., Moral, Cognitive, and Social: The Nature of Blame, SOC. THINKING & INTERPERSONAL BEHAV. (Joseph P. 
Forgas, et al., eds., 2012).  
28Malle et al., supra note 27. 
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judgments of blame or pull them toward lenient judgments. There are many other variables that 
enter into the blame equation. Some variables are more familiar, such as the severity of the harm, 
or the actor’s intent. But other potential antecedents of blame are considered more problematic, 
at least by some theorists. On the one hand, it is well settled that an actor’s race, for example, or 
nationality, or religion should not influence our perceptions of blame for harm caused by that 
actor.29 On the other hand, law sometimes permits consideration of an actor’s motive.30
There is evidence for the proposition that our perception of a person’s motive is 
important for our understanding of that person’s moral character. For example, a soccer player 
who intentionally spikes a player on the opposing team is seen as being less moral as a person 
when his motive was for personal gain (trying to win the game) than when his motive was 
reactionary (retaliation for being recently bumped and taunted by the other player).
 In this 
vein, consider another characteristic: the actor’s moral character. The fact that John the cocaine 
hider was perceived as more blameworthy and causal than John the present hider might have 
been as much a function of John being derogated as a drug user as John’s motives being 
derogated as illegitimate. Thus, an actor’s bad motive might simply establish that the subsequent 
harm was not justified by the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct, as the law explicitly 
recognizes. Alternatively, an actor’s bad motive might serve as a proxy for that actor’s bad moral 
character, which is derogated and leads perceivers to blame more harshly.  
31 Similarly, a 
person who administers an electric shock to another person for monetary gain is rated less moral 
than a person who shocks another person to avoid being shocked himself.32
                                                          
29 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f). 
 The influence of 
motive on perceptions of moral character can sometimes be dramatic, transforming an outlaw 
30 See footnote 18, supra. 
31 Glenn D. Reeder et al., Inferences About the Morality of an Aggressor: The Role of Perceived Motive, 83 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 789, 792–94 (2002). 
32 Id. at 794–95. 
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into a hero, or at least an anti-villain. Consider, for example, the television character named 
Omar Little on the HBO series The Wire. Omar robs and kills drug dealers for a living, but at the 
same time upholds his own moral code, which entails not harming law-abiding citizens, and no 
thuggery on Sundays. Because there is a kind of purity in his motives, Omar garners more moral 
admiration than condemnation. Motive, therefore, can make or break perceptions of moral 
character. 
In everyday social life, sorting the “bad guys” from the “good guys” plays an important 
social function. When we encounter a new person, we immediately size up her “perceived 
intent”—traits like friendliness, trustworthiness, and helpfulness signal whether the other is a 
friend or foe.33 We make these judgments remarkably quickly. In one study, for example, when a 
photo of a face was flashed for a fraction of a second, people were most reliable at judging 
trustworthiness, compared to other traits like competence and likeability.34 We are especially 
keen to size other people up first on moral traits, and only later on non-moral traits (such as 
competence and intelligence), perhaps because the friend or foe question is an especially 
important one when encountering a stranger.35
The primacy of moral character judgments suggests that these concerns might infuse the 
process of blaming. That is, when we are deciding the extent to which to blame an actor who has 
caused harm, we might be implicitly asking ourselves, “To what extent is this actor a bad 
person?” rather than (or perhaps in addition to) “To what extent is this particular action 
 
                                                          
33 See Susan T. Fiske et al., Universal Dimensions of Social Cognition: Warmth and Competence, 11 TRENDS IN 
COGNITIVE SCIENCES 77, 77 (2007) (describing the fundamental nature of the two dimensions of warmth and 
competence in social cognition). 
34 Janine Willis & Alexander Todorov, First Impressions: Making Up Your Mind After a 100-Ms Exposure to a 
Face, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 592, 594 (2006). 
35 See id.; Bogdan Wojciszke et al., On the Dominance of Moral Categories in Impression Formation, 24 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1251, 1254–55 (1998) (finding that subjects found moral traits to be more 
important than competence traits when forming impressions of strangers). 
16  LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS  [Vol. 75 
 
wrong?”36
The study of John the driver suggests that we do, in fact, engage in character-based 
blaming, at least insofar as information about John’s motive for speeding (hiding cocaine or 
hiding a present) informs our perception of John’s moral character. The case of Sam—the man 
who stored the oxygen tanks in his shed illustrates even more clearly that we engage in character 
based blaming. In our experiment, not only did we find that people blame Sam more harshly 
when his motive was cheating rather than caretaking, but we also found that Sam’s motive 
 Because blaming might be focused to a large extent on perceptions of the actor’s 
moral character, then anything that influences our perceptions of the actor’s moral character is 
likely to influence our judgments of blame for harm. Character perceptions might be gleaned 
from the act itself. For example, consider a large man walking down a narrow hallway who 
bumps a passerby with his shoulder, and then calls the passerby a derogatory name. Those 
actions, in themselves, are likely to trigger negative perceptions of the actor’s moral character. If 
blame judgments derive primarily from character judgments, then the blame process is relatively 
simple: only a bad person would do such a thing, so this actor is to blame. If blame judgments 
are constructed by assessing various factors surrounding the act, then the process is quite 
different: we examine the extent to which the harm was intentional, the extent to which the actor 
caused it, and the severity of the harm, and then decide whether the act was wrong, and finally 
whether the actor had any excuse or justification. The latter process can be thought of as act-
based blaming, as opposed to character-based blaming. The result may be the same (at least in 
some cases), but the focus is quite different. The main point to note here is that act-based 
blaming does not consider the actor’s moral character.  
                                                          
36 See David A. Pizarro & David Tannenbaum, Bringing Character Back: How the Motivation to Evaluate Character 
Influences Judgments of Moral Blame 97, in The SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY: EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF 
GOOD AND EVIL (Mario Mikulincer & Phillip R. Shaver, eds., 2011)) (“[P]roposing a person-based character 
approach as an alternative to the act-based theories.”).  
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influenced perceptions of Sam’s moral character: Sam who stored oxygen to cheat was judged to 
have less of a moral character, be less trustworthy, and be more of a bad person than Sam who 
stored oxygen to take care of his sick daughter.37
In this article, I expand the inquiry begun earlier regarding the relationship between 
moral character and blame. Specifically, I investigate the extent to which information about 
moral character influences blame even when that moral character information is independent 
from the harmful act. For example, if Joe kills a man in a bar fight, do we blame him less if we 
also learn that Joe spends his free time as a volunteer tutor for underprivileged youth? 
Conversely, do we blame him more if we learn that Joe is a greedy miser who refuses to help 
support his elderly mother? There is already some evidence that suggests that independent 
information about moral character can influence blame judgments. 
 Thus, to judge moral character people 
sometimes use information derived from the act itself (as in the shoulder bump example), and 
they sometimes use information derived from the motive for the act (as in John the driver and 
Sam the oxygen storer). In either case, to the extent that the blaming process focuses on the actor 
rather than the act, inferences about character will inform perceptions of blame, no matter how 
they were derived,. 
38
                                                          
37 Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 2. 
  In one study, participants 
read a story about Jack, who argued with and then pushed another man. The man slipped and 
suffered serious injuries. Jack was presented as someone who helped a stranded motorist, gave 
extra time off to a worker, and volunteered at a homeless shelter, or alternatively, as someone 
who drove by the motorist, denied the time off to the worker, and made an excuse to not 
volunteer at the homeless shelter. People rated “bad Jack” as more to blame for the victim’s 
injuries than “good Jack.”  
38 Mark D. Alicke, Evidential and Extra-Evidential Evaluations of Social Conduct., 9 J. SOC. BEHAV. & 
PERSONALITY 591, 595–601 (1994). 
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I sought to replicate and extend this finding. First, in the experiment reported in this 
article, I focused on the influence of independent evidence of character on judgments of blame 
when the severity of the harm is extreme—that is, death. It is possible that when the resulting 
harm is grave, the impulse to blame becomes so strong that it overwhelms any potential 
influence of independent information about moral character. The plausibility of this hypothesis is 
supported by numerous experimental studies that consistently find that actors are blamed more 
harshly for severe harm than for mild harm, even when other circumstances are held constant.39
An alternative, competing hypothesis, is that independent information about moral 
character influences blame judgments even for severe outcomes such as death. This hypothesis is 
supported by the results of the study involving Sam, who was found more blameworthy for an 
accidental death when his motive for storing the oxygen was bad than when it was good. In that 
study, bad motive led to perceptions of bad moral character, which led to increased blaming. By 
contrast, in the experiment reported here, moral character is derived not from motive, but from 
information largely independent of reasons for acting. According to this competing hypothesis, 
information about moral character will influence judgments of blame for a severe outcome 
regardless of whether the moral character inference derives from the actor’s motive or from an 
independent source. 
  
The second aim of the experiment reported in this article was to examine variations in the 
actor’s state of mind, to ascertain whether the influence of moral character information varies 
according to the actor’s level of awareness of the risk of harm (for example, reckless versus 
negligent). It is well established empirically that blame judgments generally increase with 
                                                          
39 For a review, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Outcome Severity and Judgments of “Responsibility”: A Meta‐Analytic 
Review, 30 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2575 (2000) (demonstrating that people attribute greater responsibility for a 
harm when the harm is severe than when the harm is minor). 
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increasingly culpable states of mind,40 so that an actor who causes harm recklessly, for example, 
is perceived as more blameworthy than one who causes harm negligently.41
A related hypothesis regarding moral character and mental state is that people’s 
perceptions of mental state themselves are influenced by the actor’s moral character. For 
example, people might perceive an act as intentional precisely because it was performed by an 
actor with a bad moral character, whereas that same act might be perceived as merely reckless if 
the actor’s character is good (or if character information is absent). After all, mental state is 
rarely if ever completely knowable. In making the uncertain determination about mental state, 
people might use information about character to fill in the blanks.
 The joint influence 
of bad moral character and culpable mental state might be additive. It might be the case, for 
example, that a negligent actor with a bad moral character is blamed just as harshly as a reckless 
actor—in this sense, moral character becomes a kind of proxy for a more culpable mens rea. In 
addition, a reckless actor with good moral character might receive more lenient treatment in 
terms of perceptions of blameworthiness, and be blamed only as much as a negligent actor. The 
experiment reported here tests these possibilities. 
42 As Pizarro and Tannenbaum 
put it, “Bad people, by definition, are likely to desire and intend bad things.”43
                                                          
40 That intentionally doing something bad is worse than doing it unintentionally is understood by children, see John 
M. Darley et al., Intentions and Their Contexts in the Moral Judgments of Children and Adults, 49 CHILD DEV. 66, 
67–68 (1978), as well as by adults, see John M. Darley et al., Doing Wrong Without Creating Harm, 7 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 30 (2010); Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution, and Legal Liability: An 
Empirical Study, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (2001). 
 The epistemic 
elusiveness of the mental states of others suggests the possibility that our judgments about those 
mental states are vulnerable to a variety of influences. Experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe 
argues that intentionality judgments are more than just factual descriptions of others’ mental 
41 See Jones et al., this volume. 
42 See Pizarro & Tannenbaum, supra note 36, at 11–12 (“For instance, if there is evidence that an individual is a bad 
person, the inference that he or she intended a negative outcome seems reasonable.”). 
43 Id. at 12. 
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states—they are also normative judgments about praise and blame.44 Experimental evidence 
supports this view, and suggests that moral judgments about an act and its outcome can affect 
perceptions about the extent to which that act was performed intentionally. For example, people 
are more likely to say that a company executive intentionally caused an outcome if the outcome 
was negative (harming the environment) than if the outcome was positive (helping the 
environment).45 This is true despite the fact that in both versions of the vignette, the executive 
said that he did not care about harming or helping the environment, he only cared about making a 
profit. This suggests that people perceive the executive who caused the negative outcome as a 
bad person who must be punished, and in an effort to justify that punishment, they interpret his 
act as intentional.46
Finally, in this study we investigate the influence of emotion on blame. Moral violations 
provoke emotional reactions in observers.
 The possibility that intentionality judgments are infused with moral 
judgments suggests that the moral character of the actor influences judgments of intentionality. 
Unlike Knobe’s intentionality studies, we vary the moral character of the actor, rather than the 
valence of the outcome.  
47 For example, when considering the moral quandary 
regarding whether one ought to push a large stranger off a footbridge to his death in order to save 
five people from a runaway trolley, people become very emotionally engaged at the thought of 
pushing someone to their death.48
                                                          
44 See Joshua Knobe, Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist, 33 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 315, 317–19 (2010). 
 By comparison, people are less emotionally engaged at the 
thought of flipping a switch to redirect a runaway trolley to save five people, even though, as 
45 Id. 
46 See id. 
47 See Greene et al., supra note 20. 
48 Id. at 2106. 
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before, one person will be killed as a result.49
Witnessing behavior that poses a threat to the integrity of the social order typically 
triggers contempt, anger, disgust, or some combination of these.
 Depending on the features of the situation, 
thinking about harm can engage a variety of emotionally laden processes.  
50 These moral emotions are 
associated with disapproval of others’ behavior, and they arise spontaneously upon observing an 
actor causing harm. The experience of contempt, anger, or disgust triggers the response tendency 
to blame and punish.51 In fact, when blame and punishment goals are frustrated, “moral 
spillovers” can occur, in which observers who learn about an unpunished transgressor become 
more punitive toward unrelated acts of harm,52 or even engage in deviant behavior themselves.53
In the experiment that follows, I investigated the extent to which moral character, apart 
from motive or reasons for acting, influences judgments of blame, intent, causation, emotion, and 
punishment. To accomplish this, I varied two factors: the moral character of the actor (good or 
bad) and the mental state of the actor (aware or not aware of the risk of harm).  
 
Thus, another aim of this study is to demonstrate that a harmful outcome caused by an actor with 
a bad moral character provokes in observers negative emotional reactions in the form of anger, 
contempt, and disgust, which then lead to an increased tendency to blame and punish. 
                                                          
49 Id. 
50 See Paul Rozin et al., The CAD Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping Between Three Moral Emotions (Contempt, Anger, 
Disgust) and Three Moral Codes (Community, Autonomy, Divinity), 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574, 575 
(1999) (arguing that contempt, anger, and disgust are related "emotional reactions to the moral violations of others"). 
51 See Daniel Kahneman & Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., 
Olin Working Paper No. 346, 2007)  (examining the relation between indignation and the response tendency to 
punish the guilty actor) available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1002707; Lerner et al., supra note 10, at 570 (noting the 
role that anger plays in justice judgments). 
52 See Julie H. Goldberg et al., Rage and Reason: The Psychology of the Intuitive Prosecutor, 29 EUR. J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 781, 787–89 (1999) (examining the relationship between anger over injustice and determinations of who 
deserves punishment). 
53 See Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of Moral Violations on Deviant Behavior, 44 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1239, 1243 (2008) (finding that observing outcomes that violate strongly held 
moral beliefs can lead to engaging in deviant behavior."); Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 
1440 (2005) (arguing that perceptions of injustice in the law can sometimes lead people to display a greater 
willingness to disregard the law ). 





EXPERIMENT: THE EFFECT OF RECKLESSNESS AND CHARACTER ON MORAL EMOTION AND BLAME 
 
 
 The experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that bad moral character influences 
perceptions of blame, and that this influence increases as mens rea weakens. A group of adults 
volunteered to participate in an online questionnaire which varied both the moral character of the 
wrongdoer and the wrongdoer’s mental state. The case is loosely based upon People v. Hall, 54
A. Participants 
 a 
Colorado Supreme Court case that held that a skier who causes death can be tried for reckless 
manslaughter. Some of the facts of the actual Hall case were retained, but fictional details were 
added to permit variation of moral character and mental state. 
 
A total of 201 participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web 
service, which allows assignment of simple tasks to a large population of users online. 
Participants were paid $1.50 for completing the survey, which took about five minutes. 
Participants were assured that their responses would remain anonymous and that identifying 
information would not be collected. Seven participants were excluded because they failed to 
correctly respond to an instructional manipulation check,55
                                                          
54 999 P.2d 207 (Colo. 2000) 
 leaving a sample size of 194 
participants. Of these, 83% identified as White, 4% as Black, 2% as Hispanic, 6% as Asian 
Pacific, 4% as South Asian, 1% as Middle Eastern and 1% as other. Sixty-seven percent were 
55 See Daniel M. Oppenheimer et al., Instructional manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical 
power, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 867 (2009) (describing instructional manipulation checks as a question 
embedded within the experiment requiring the participant to confirm reading the instruction). In our experiment, we 
asked “According to the story, Nathan spent most of his free time doing what?” and asked respondents to choose 
one of four options: Watching television; Volunteering; Reading; None of the above. 
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college educated. The mean age was about forty-one years. Women comprised 61% of the 
sample.56
B. Design and Materials 
  
 
Participants were randomly divided and placed into one of four groups, based on the two 
independent variables. The first variable, moral character, had two levels: good or bad. The 
second variable, recklessness, also had two levels: low or high. The variables were incorporated 
into the vignette that follows. The experimental design was two by two between subjects, so that 
each participant saw only one of the four versions of the vignette, reproduced below: 
Nathan is a 24 year old man who works as a ski lift operator on Vail Mountain in 
Colorado. He is an experienced skier and was a member of his high school skiing team. 
 
[Good Character]: Nathan is considered a model employee. He always arrives on time for 
his  shift, and works hard. His supervisor considers him responsible and reliable. From 
May through September, when the ski slopes are closed, Nathan spends his time 
volunteering at a local animal shelter, as well as helping his family run their small 
business. 
 
[Bad Character]: Nathan is not considered a good employee. He often arrives late for his 
shift, and is sometimes caught absent from his post. His supervisor considers him 
irresponsible and unreliable. From May through September, when the ski slopes are 
closed, Nathan spends his time loafing around town and watching TV. His family has a 
small business but he rarely helps them out with their work. 
 
One day in April, after finishing his shift, Nathan left his post at the top of the mountain 
and headed down the hill. He was skiing very fast, ski tips in the air, his weight back on 
his skis and his arms out to his sides. It was late in the day, and there were only a few 
skiers on the slope.  
 
[Low Recklessness]: Nathan felt confident that he could avoid anyone in his path, but 
then he lost control.  
 
[High Recklessness]: Nathan was feeling reckless that day, and he knew there was a risk 
he might hit someone but he didn’t care, and then he lost control. 
 
                                                          
56 Although we did not collect additional demographic information in this particular experiment, similar recent 
experiments conducted by the author drawing from the same Mechanical Turk population yielded samples that were: 
95% U.S. residents for at least the past 12 years; 56% with a household income of less than $50,000 per year; 48% 
liberal or very liberal; 28% moderate, 25% conservative or very conservative. 
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He was skiing out of control for some time when he took flight off of a knoll, and was 
unable to stop when he saw people on the slope below him. Nathan’s ski collided with 
the head of one of those people, Alan. 
Unfortunately, Alan suffered a severe brain injury and died a few days later. A test of 
Nathan’s blood determined that there were no drugs or alcohol in Nathan’s system at the 
time of the accident.  
 
Each participant read only one version of the vignette.57
 As a check on the character manipulation, participants rated three items which were 
presented in random order: Nathan’s good moral character (1=not at all; 7=very much), Nathan’s 
trustworthiness (1=not at all; 7=very much), and the extent to which Nathan is a good person 
(1=bad person; 7=good person). As a check on the recklessness manipulation, participants rated 
two items presented in random order: the extent to which Nathan believed he could kill someone 
because of the way he was skiing (1=not at all; 7=very much), and the extent to which Nathan 
believed he could injure someone because of the way he was skiing (1=not at all; 7=very much). 
 After reading the vignette, 
participants were asked to provide their own personal opinion about Nathan and his role in the 
death of Alan: to what extent he is responsible; how negatively he should be judged; how much 
he is to blame; to what extent he caused the death; how intentional were his actions; and how 
foreseeable was death from Nathan’s perspective. All questions were measured on a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The order of presentation of these questions was 
random. 
 To gauge participants’ emotions experienced as a result of reading the story, we first 
asked them how angry they were feeling right now (1=not at all angry; 7=very angry), how 
upsetting the story was (1=not at all upsetting; 7=very upsetting). Participants were then asked: 
“When you think about Nathan, to what extent do you feel...?” Following this question stem, 
                                                          
57 The four versions of the vignette were: good moral character / low recklessness; good moral character / high 
recklessness; bad moral character / low recklessness; bad moral character / high recklessness. Each participant read 
only one of these four versions. 
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participants separately rated the extent to which they felt disgust, contempt, and compassion 
(1=not at all; 7=very much). 
 Finally, participants assessed deserved punishment by indicating how severely Nathan 
should be punished for the death of Alan (1=not at all; 7=very severely), and what kind of prison 






1. Manipulation Checks 
Judgments of Nathan’s moral character, trustworthiness, and goodness were highly 
correlated,59 and were combined into a single measure of perceived overall moral character 
consisting of the mean of these ratings. As predicted, perceptions of Nathan’s overall moral 
character depended on whether he was described as a responsible worker, volunteer and son 
(good Nathan) or an irresponsible worker and son (bad Nathan).60
The vignette also varied according to Nathan’s awareness of the risk of harm. Judgments 
of the extent to which Nathan believed he might kill and believed he might injure someone 
because of the way he was skiing were highly correlated,
 This provides evidence that 
perceived moral character was successfully manipulated. 
61
                                                          
58 All analyses were conducted using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) unless otherwise noted. An analysis of 
variance measures for statistical differences between the means of groups whose data are categorical (as opposed to 
continuous). WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS 376-81(5th ed. 1994). Throughout the results section of this article, 
“significantly” refers to statistical significance, which denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis--the possibility of 
no differences between the various groups--at a probability level indicated by the p-value reported. Thus, “p” is 
defined as the probability of finding a difference or relationship between two groups as large as that observed if 
there were, in fact, no difference or relationship between them. Id. at 267-82.  
 and were combined into a single 
59 Cronbach’s alpha = .95. Cronbach's alpha measures the internal consistency of a set of items, and ranges between 
0 and 1, with higher numbers indicating higher consistency. RICK H. HOYLE ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL 
RELATIONS 83-84 (7th ed. 2002). 
60 F(1, 193) = 331.92, p < .001, ηp2 =.634; Mean (Good Character) = 5.41; Mean (Bad Character) = 2.69.  
61 Cronbach’s alpha = .87. 
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measure of awareness of risk consisting of the mean of these judgments. As predicted, 
perceptions of Nathan’s awareness of risk depended on whether he was described as being aware 
or not aware of the risk of injury or death.62
2. Responsibility Judgments 
 This provides evidence that the extent to which 
Nathan was judged to be aware of the risk of causing injury or death was successfully 
manipulated. 
Did moral character and recklessness influence the extent to which Nathan is perceived 
as responsible, blameworthy, and judged negatively for the death of Alan? The three dependent 
measures were highly correlated, so they were combined into a single measure of Overall 
Responsibility.63 The means are illustrated in Figure 1. Nathan was perceived as having more 
overall responsibility for Alan’s death if his character was bad rather than good;64 Nathan was 
also perceived as more responsible if he was aware of the possibility of death or injury, 
compared to if he was not aware.65 These two main effects were qualified by a significant 
interaction,66 depicted in Figure 1. Nathan’s overall responsibility depended on his moral 
character, but this difference was more prominent when mens rea was weak—that is, when 
Nathan was not aware of the risk of injury or death. Planned contrasts nevertheless confirmed 
that “bad Nathan” was perceived to be more overall responsible than “good Nathan,” both when 
Nathan’s mens rea was reckless67 and when it was not reckless.68
  
  
                                                          
62 F(1, 191) = 112.60, p < .001, ηp2 =.372; Mean (Aware) = 4.73; Mean (Not Aware) = 2.54. 
63 Cronbach’s alpha=.91. 
64 F(1, 193) = 33.61, p < .001, ηp2 =.123. 
65 F(1, 193) = 45.19, p < .001, ηp2 =.166. 
66 F(1, 193) = 7.58, p < .05, ηp2 =.017. 
67 z = 2.57, p = .01. 
68 z = 5.63, p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Mean ratings of Nathan’s overall responsibility in the death of Alan, by moral character 
and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much)  
 
3. Judgments of Causation 
Participants rated the extent to which Nathan caused the death of Alan. Nathan was 
judged to be a stronger cause of Alan’s death when he was aware of the risk before he acted, 
compared to when he was not aware.69 As depicted in Figure 2, there was no character-driven 
difference in perceived causation when Nathan’s mens rea was reckless.70 The pattern of means 
depicted in Figure 2 suggests that when Nathan was not aware of the risk of death or injury “bad 
Nathan” was perceived to be a stronger cause of Alan’s death than “good Nathan.” However, a 
planned contrast testing this difference did not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance.71
                                                          
69 F(1, 193) = 13.68; p < .001, ηp2 =.066; Mean (Reckless) = 6.43; Mean (Not Reckless) = 5.76. We did not detect a 
statistically significant main effect of moral character on causation. F(1, 193) = 3.74; p =.127, ηp2 =.011. Mean 
(Good Character) = 5.97; Mean (Bad Character) = 6.23. Similarly, there was no significant interaction between 
character and recklessness on judgments of causation. F(1, 193) = 1.78; p < .29, ηp2 =.006. Planned contrasts reveal 
effects of character within each mens rea category, as detailed in the text. 
 Therefore, it is unclear whether moral character played any role in perceptions of 
70 A planned contrast shows no difference between good and bad character within the reckless mens rea group. z = 
0.34, p = .74. 
71 z = 1.83, p = .067. 
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causation in this experiment, although the pattern of means suggests that the actions of “bad 
Nathan” might have been perceived as more causal than “good Nathan” when mens rea was not 
reckless. Further research will be required to investigate this relationship. 
 
Figure 2. Mean ratings of the extent to which Nathan caused the death of Alan, by moral 
character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much) 
 
4. Judgments of Intent 
Participants rated the extent to which Nathan acted intentionally in the death of Alan. 
When Nathan’s moral character was bad, he was judged to have acted more intentionally than 
when his moral character was good.72 In addition, and perhaps not surprisingly, when Nathan 
was aware of the risk of death or injury, he was judged to have acted more intentionally than 
when he acted without awareness.73 Planned contrasts indicate when Nathan acted recklessly, 
“bad Nathan” was perceived to have acted more intentionally than “good Nathan.”74
                                                          
72 F(1, 193) = 17.70, p < .001, ηp2 =.077; Mean (Good Character) = 1.51; Mean (Bad Character) = 2.17. 
 Similarly, 
73 F(1, 193) = 331.92, p < .001, ηp2 =.634; Mean (Good Character) = 1.46; Mean (Bad Character) = 2.20. The 
interaction between character and recklessness was not statistically significant. F(1, 193) = 1.43; p=.23. 
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when Nathan acted without recklessness, “bad Nathan” was perceived as acting more 
intentionally than “good Nathan.”75
 
 The intention judgment means are depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Mean ratings of the extent to which Nathan acted intentionally toward the death of 
Alan, by moral character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much) 
 
5. Judgments of Foreseeability 
Finally, participants rated the extent to which Alan’s death was foreseeable from 
Nathan’s perspective. Not surprisingly, the death was judged to be more foreseeable when 
Nathan was described as being aware of the risk, compared to when he was not.76 More 
important, participants judged Alan’s death to be more foreseeable from “bad Nathan’s” 
perspective than from “good Nathan’s” perspective.77 Planned contrasts indicate that the 
character-driven difference just described emerges only when Nathan acted recklessly;78
                                                          
75 z = 2.13, p = .03. 
 when 
76 F(1, 193) = 32.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .139; Mean (Reckless) = 3.62; Mean (Not Reckless) = 2.39.  
77 F(1, 193) = 12.03, p < .001, ηp2 =.051; Mean (Good Character) = 2.65; Mean (Bad Character) = 3.38. The 
character*reckless interaction did not reach statistical significance. F(1, 193) = 2.39, p.=.12. 
78 z=3.54, p < .001. 
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Nathan acted without recklessness, there was no reliable difference in foreseeability between 
“bad Nathan” and “good Nathan.”79
 
 The foreseeability means are depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Mean ratings of the extent to which Alan’s death was foreseeable from Nathan’s 
perspective, by moral character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much) 
 
6. Punishment Judgments 
Judgments of how severely Nathan should be punished and of what length prison term he 
should receive were highly correlated,80 so they were combined into a single measure, in which a 
rating of “1” indicates no punishment and “7” indicates severe punishment. Participants judged 
Nathan as deserving more severe punishment when he acted with a reckless mental state 
compared to when he was not reckless.81 In addition, there was a main effect for character, such 
that “bad Nathan” was perceived to deserve more severe punishment than “good Nathan.”82
                                                          
79 z=1.36, p < .174. 
 
Planned contrasts confirmed that the increased punishment severity for “bad Nathan” (compared 
80 Cronbach’s alpha = .88. 
81 F(1, 193) = 54.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .198, Mean (reckless) = 4.46; Mean (not reckless) = 3.15. 
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Figure 5. Mean ratings of punishment severity, by moral character and awareness (1=no 
punishment; 7=severe punishment) 
 
7. Moral Emotion 
Participants indicated how angry they were feeling, how upsetting the story was, and 
when they thought about Nathan, to what extent they felt disgust, contempt, and compassion. 
The compassion item was reverse coded. All five items were correlated,85
The two independent variables—mens rea and character—influenced participants’ 
negative moral emotion. Specifically, when participants learned that Nathan acted with a reckless 
state of mind, participants’ moral emotions were more negative than if Nathan’s state of mind 
was described as not reckless.
 and were combined 
into an index of negative moral emotion.  
86
                                                          
83 z =3.45, p < .001. 
 Similarly, reading about “bad Nathan” led participants to 
84 z =4.66, p < .001. 
85 Cronbach’s alpha = .84. 
86 F(1, 190) = 27.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .092, Mean (reckless) = 4.21; Mean (not reckless) = 3.34. 
32  LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS  [Vol. 75 
 
experience more negative emotion than reading about “good Nathan.”87 There was no 
statistically significant interaction between state of mind and character.88
The fact that mens rea and moral character each influenced both moral emotion and 
overall responsibility raises the question of whether negative moral emotion mediates the 
relationship between character and overall responsibility, as well as the relationship between 
mens rea and overall responsibility. Assuming that negative emotion could mediate the 
relationship between moral character and perceptions of overall responsibility,
 
89 we investigated 
its statistical significance by first testing whether there is a relationship between character and 
participants’ experiences of negative emotion. We found that, indeed, these two factors were 
related.90 A second regression showed that character influenced perceptions of overall 
responsibility.91 Then we regressed perceptions of overall responsibility on character and moral 
emotion simultaneously, and found that moral emotion predicts perceptions of overall 
responsibility after controlling for character.92 Character no longer predicted overall 
responsibility after controlling for moral emotion.93 The indirect nature of the effect of character 
on perceptions of responsibility was further confirmed using a bootstrapping procedure.94
                                                          
87 F(1, 190) = 79.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .269, Mean (bad) = 4.55; Mean (good) = 3.04. 
 It is 
therefore possible that learning about harm caused by an actor with a bad moral character leads 
to negative moral emotion, which in turn leads to strong attributions of blame and responsibility. 
88 F(1, 190) = 1.89, p = .17.  
89 See Klaus Fiedler et al., What Mediation Analysis Can (Not) Do, J.  47 EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.1231 (2011) 
(describing how statistical mediation analysis can "examine the degree to which a third variable (Z) accounts for the 
influence of an independent (X) on a dependent variable (Y) conditional on the assumption that Z actually is a 
mediator"),       
90 β = 1.51, t(190) = 8.24, p < .001. 
91 β =1.04, t(190) = 5.06, p < .001. 
92 β = .62, t(190) = 9.04, p < .001. 
93 β = .09, t(190) = .46, p = .64. 
94  See Kristopher J. Preacher & Andrew F. Hayes, Asymptotic and Resampling Strategies for Assessing and 
Comparing Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models, 40 BEHAVIOR RESEARCH METHODS 879 (2008). Using 
5000 bootstrapped resamples of the data, the analysis revealed a 95% confidence interval of .64 to 1.23. 
Bootstrapping is a nonparametric resampling procedure which does not impose the assumption of normality of the 
sampling distribution. Id. at 880. 
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At the same time it is also possible that stronger mens rea (that is, recklessness) leads 
perceivers to experience negative moral emotion, which in turn leads to greater attributions of 
blame and responsibility. We tested the statistical significance of this hypothesized relationship 
by first testing whether there is a relationship between Nathan’s mens rea and participants’ 
experience of negative emotion, and found that indeed, these two factors are related.95 A second 
regression showed that Nathan’s mens rea influenced perceptions of overall responsibility.96 
Then we regressed perceptions of overall responsibility on mens rea and moral emotion 
simultaneously, and found that moral emotion predicts perceptions of overall responsibility after 
controlling for mens rea.97 However, mens rea still predicted overall responsibility after 
controlling for moral emotion.98
One question not yet addressed is the extent to which people consciously endorse the idea 
of using the moral character of the actor to gauge judgments of blame, causation, and intent. It is 
possible that when we judge blame and responsibility for harm, we deliberately take into account 
the actor’s moral character. It might be, for example, that we explicitly infer that a person with a 
bad character has caused undetected harms in the past, so that they deserve to be blamed and 
punished more now that he is caught. On the other hand, it is possible that when we take account 
of moral character in blame judgments, we do so without even realizing it. It might be, for 
example, when confronted with two identical harms committed by actors with identical mental 
states, we would disavow blaming and punishing differently based upon differences in the 
actors’ moral character.  
 Thus, it seems implausible that moral emotion mediates the 
relationship between mens rea and attributions of blame and responsibility. 
                                                          
95 β = -.88, t(190) = -4.29, p < .001. 
96 β = -1.22, t(190) = -6.12, p < .001. 
97 β = .56, t(190) = 9.53, p < .001. 
98 β = -.76, t(190) = -4.37, p < .001. 
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8. Illuminating the Influence of Moral Character 
To investigate the extent to which people explicitly endorse using moral character 
information to assess an actor’s responsibility, intentionality, and deserved punishment, a follow 
up experiment was conducted. The experiment was identical to the first experiment presented in 
this article, with one key exception: this time, each participant made judgments about BOTH 
“good Nathan” and “bad Nathan”. The recklessness manipulation remained, as in the first 
experiment between subjects. Thus, each participant received two versions of the story. In the 
reckless version, participants assessed the blameworthiness of reckless “good Nathan” and 
reckless “bad Nathan”. In the not reckless version, participants assessed the blameworthiness of 
non-reckless “good Nathan” and non-reckless “bad Nathan”. The order of presentation good and 
bad moral character was counter balanced, so that half the participants rated “good Nathan” first 
and then “bad Nathan” and half did the reverse.  Using this method, we assessed the extent to 
which participants would try to keep their assessments of Nathan’s blameworthiness consistent 
across the two versions of the story that differed only according to Nathan’s moral character. 
The participants in this follow-up study -- Experiment 2 -- were recruited in the same method 
as the first study, using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web service. A total of 48 participants 
completed the questionnaire, and were paid $1.50 each.99 The results revealed that the 
differences in perceptions of responsibility, cause, intent, foreseeability, and punishment 
demonstrated in the first experiment disappeared when each participant judged both “good 
Nathan” and “bad Nathan”.100
                                                          
99 Because the design of this experiment was within-subjects, we were able to achieve sufficient statistical power for 
hypothesis testing using a smaller number of participants. 
 This is illustrated in Figure 6, which depicts overall responsibility 
100 Causation(reckless): Mean (good) = 6.50; Mean(bad)=6.62. Causation(not reckless): Mean(good) = 5.95; 
Mean(bad) = 6.09. Intent(reckless): Mean(good) = 3.16; Mean(bad) = 3.31. Intent(not reckless): Mean(good)=1.64; 
Mean(bad)=1.82. Foreseeable(reckless): Mean(good)=3.85; Mean(bad)=4.04. Foreseeable(not reckless): 
Mean(good) = 2.73; Mean(bad) = 2.86. Punish(reckless): Mean(good) = 4.73; Mean(bad) = 4.98. Punish(not 
reckless): Mean(good) = 3.33; Mean(bad)=3.75. All t’s < 1.0; all p’s> .60. 
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judgments in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. When participants judged the overall 
responsibility of just one version of Nathan in Experiment 1, their judgment was influenced by 
Nathan’s moral character. This was true regardless of whether Nathan’s state of mind was 
described as reckless (left panel of Figure 6) or not reckless (right panel of Figure 6). Note that 
these statistically significant differences in overall responsibility judgments disappeared in 
Experiment 2, when each participant read two stories (about “good Nathan” and “bad Nathan”) 
and made two overall responsibility judgments. In this context, participants now perceived 
Nathan’s overall responsibility roughly the same, regardless of whether his moral character was 
good or bad. The statistically significant differences in perceived responsibility based on the 
actor’s moral character disappeared when differences in moral character were made explicit.101
 
 
Figure 6. Mean ratings of Nathan’s overall responsibility in the death of Alan, by moral 
character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much), comparing Experiment 1 (moral character 
between subjects) with Experiment 2 (within subjects). 
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IV 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
To a large degree, liability in the criminal law is based on the notion of blameworthiness. 
For most crimes, liability requires a morally blameworthy act. For example, a person who uses 
force against another person in self defense is not criminally liable because under the 
circumstance, the act is considered not worthy of blame. Legal blame in criminal law is 
predicated on the idea that the actor performed a prohibited act, accompanied by a specific 
mental state, without justification or excuse. Yet, the results reported in this article provide 
further support for the idea that the blaming process is infused with motivation and emotion, and 
not dictated solely by individual acts and their consequences. Humans are social beings, and 
blame is a social process. When we observe a harmful outcome, our first reactions are emotional, 
and those emotions are informed by our immediate assessment of what kind of person could 
have caused this harm. On this account, a person with a bad moral character who causes a 
harmful outcome is a person who disrespects the community’s way of life.102 As observers and 
community members, we react to such disrespect with moral outrage, and we experience the urge 
to blame and punish.103 Conversely, we are more willing to exculpate, at least partially, an 
otherwise virtuous person who causes harm, because his prior good deeds have in some sense 
licensed the transgression.104
                                                          
102 See Philip E. Tetlock et al., People as Intuitive Prosecutors: The Impact of Social-Control Goals on Attributions 
of Responsibility, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 196 (2007) (describing disrespect for a way of life as a 
source for outrage). 
  
103 See Kahneman and Sunstein, supra note___.; Samuel H. Pillsbury, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF 
MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 33 (1998) (“punishment is deserved according to the wrongdoer’s choice to 
disregard another’s value.”) 
104 See Daniel A. Effron & Benoît Monin, Letting People Off the Hook: When Do Good Deeds Excuse 
Transgressions?, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1618, 1621–23 (2010) (showing that good deeds reduce 
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In this respect, there is some tension between the process of legal blame and the 
psychology of moral blame. The experimental results indicate that, as a psychological process, 
moral blame is sometimes informed by emotion. Our emotional reactions are not only a product 
of the act and the outcome, but also a product of inferences about the general virtuousness of the 
person who performed the act that caused the harm. Reading about “bad Nathan” made 
participants feel angry, disgusted, and full of contempt; these emotions then led to blaming and 
punishing “bad Nathan” more severely than “good Nathan.” The legal blame process is limited 
to considerations of mental state, conduct, and result; the psychological blame process includes 
those considerations but seems to involve much more, including the emotions of the perceiver 
and the moral character of the actor. Other variables, not examined here, can doubtless come into 
play in the psychological blame process, including perceptions of victim characteristics.105
Legal and psychological blame processes also are in tension regarding assessment of the 
actor’s mental state. Procedures for legal blame assume an assessment of mental state that is 
independent of the moral character of the actor. But the results reported here show that 
perceptions of intent, foreseeability, and possibly causation, can be colored by independent 
reasons for thinking the actor is a bad person (Figures 3 and 4). Remarkably, this result holds 
true even when, as here, the mental state of the actor was clearly specified—Nathan was 
described as being either aware or unaware of the possibility of harming someone. Therefore, 
even when mental state is “knowable,” we construct mental state from more than just inferences 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
condemnation when they are in a different domain (for example, crusading against drugs) than the subsequent 
transgression (for example, committing sexual harassment)). 
105 See Mitchell J. Callan et al., The Consequences of Victim Physical Attractiveness on Reactions to Injustice: The 
Role of Observers’ Belief in a Just World, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 433, 441 (2007) ("[W]e found clear evidence that the 
death of a physically attractive versus less attractive victim increased participants' punishment reactions."); Mary R. 
Rose, Janice Nadler & Jim Clark, Appropriately Upset? Emotion Norms and Perceptions of Crime Victims, 30 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 203 (2006) (examining the possibility that victims expressing less emotion may have less 
punishment assigned to the offender); Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology 
of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 434–37 (2003) (noting that victim characteristics can influence 
punishment judgments). 
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surrounding the act itself, but also inferences about the goodness or badness of the person who 
performed it. We give the benefit of the doubt to a person with a virtuous character who causes 
harm; we perceive his actions as less intentional and perhaps even less causal, and the harm less 
foreseeable than if his character is flawed. Thus, compared to the unreliable loafer, the reliable 
employee who helps the local animal shelter and pitches in when his family needs help is blamed 
and punished less harshly, and we align our perceptions of his mental state and the harm’s 
foreseeability accordingly. Remarkably, it seems that we do not deliberately use character 
information to inform responsibility judgments, for when differences in character are made 
explicit, as in Experiment 2, we moderate our responsibility judgments so that we hold the 
virtuous harmdoer equally responsible as the ignoble harmdoer. 
It is not clear why we would want to disavow the influence of the actor’s character in our 
judgments of blame and responsibility. After all, a person who is an unreliable worker and an 
irresponsible son has demonstrated that he holds “an attitude of indifference to the welfare of 
others.”106
Recall, as well, that this inference appears to be driven by our emotional reaction to 
Nathan. Compared to “good Nathan”, when Nathan was portrayed as having an ignoble 
character, his actions triggered more negative emotions involving anger, disgust, and contempt. 
That Nathan seemed to be indifferent to the welfare of the people around him made us 
 Our impulse to more harshly blame “bad Nathan” for causing the death of the skier 
perhaps reflects the inference that just as he was indifferent to his employer, to the patrons he 
served in his employment, and to his parents, “bad Nathan” was also indifferent to the welfare of 
the person he collided with when he decided to ski in a dangerous fashion. This inference may or 
may not accurately reflect “bad Nathan’s” mental state; but it is an inference that is arguably 
reasonable to draw. 
                                                          
106 See Pillsbury supra note 104 at 161. 
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emotionally upset, and it is these moral emotions that appeared to drive our impulse not only to 
blame and punish more harshly, but also to perceive Nathan as more aware of and intentional 
toward the harm, and possibly to have played a more causal role in it.  Thus, our own emotional 
reactions to harm might inform our perceptions of the harmdoer’s mental state. Our perception of 
the harmdoer’s mental state, can in turn, inform our perception of the severity of the harm. In one 
study, when people received shocks they thought were intentionally given, they reported them to 
be more painful than shocks they thought were unintentional, even though the magnitude of the 
shocks was actually the same.107
The results of the experiment reported here are consonant with findings regarding the 
effect of prior criminal record on actual verdicts.  One study examined over 300 criminal trials 
and found that in cases where the evidence was weak, there was a positive correlation between 
the jury learning that the defendant had committed prior crimes, and the likelihood of 
conviction.
 Further research is necessary to determine whether emotional 
reaction or perceived intention is primary, or alternatively, whether each informs the other in a 
feedback loop.  
108 A juror who hears that the defendant had committed prior crimes might infer that 
the defendant is a bad person, which might lead to inferences about mental state, causation, and 
blame that we observed in the experiment reported here. Earlier experimental research also 
suggests that jurors who hear that the defendant committed prior crimes are more prone to 
convict, especially when the defendant’s prior crimes were serious in nature or similar to the 
current accusation.109
                                                          
107 Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner, The Sting of Intentional Pain, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1260, 1261 (2008). 
 These results are consistent with the notion that when we size someone up 
as a bad person, we perceive his acts as more causal, his mental states more intentional, his 
108 Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 3, at 1388. 
109 See Greene & Dodge, supra note 4, at 69; Hans & Doob, supra note 4, at 237-38; Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 4, 
at 753-55; Wissler & Saks, supra note 4, at 47. 
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creation of risk more foreseeable, and his blameworthiness greater, than a similarly situated good 
person. 
It is important to note, however, that the focus of this article is not on the narrow question 
of the influence of prior crimes—it is on the broader question of the influence of moral character 
writ large, however those inferences about moral character are made, whether through prior 
crimes or otherwise. Note that the basis for inferring bad moral character need not be extreme. In 
contrast to the prior work examining the role of serious transgressions like having committed a 
prior robbery or burglary, the experiment reported here manipulated relatively subtle character 
traits, such as being a responsible worker and son. The results demonstrate that we perceive 
badness not only in people who have seriously harmed others in the past, but also in those who 
tend to free ride within their own social groups; this perceived badness triggers evaluative 
emotions that push us toward more punitive attributions of mental state and blame. 
Moreover, unlike prior research on the influence of information about prior crimes on 
verdict, this article focuses not specifically on verdicts, but rather on the more basic social 
psychological question of how blaming processes work. The knowledge gleaned from 
investigating basic psychological processes of blame can indeed inform our understanding of 
how juries and judges decide on guilt in criminal cases and liability in tort cases. But it can do 
much more than that. When a prosecutor decides which criminal offenses to charge in the 
indictment, and later, how lenient or harsh the plea agreement will be, these decisions may be 
influenced, without her even realizing it, by her perceptions of the moral character of the 
defendant. When an injured person decides whether or not to make a claim in tort for 
compensation, that potential plaintiff’s decision will likely be influenced by the extent to which 
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he blames the other person,110 and these attributions of blame can be intensified to the extent that 
the potential plaintiff perceives the other person as a “bad guy.” When a litigant in a business 
contract dispute refuses to settle despite the fact that the offer on the table exceeds his own 
lawyer’s estimate of the expected value of going to trial, that stubborn refusal may, in some 
cases, relate to the litigant’s perception that the litigant on other side is a bad actor or is acting in 
bad faith. And, when a jury awards punitive damages in an amount that reflects its indignation at 
the defendant’s conduct, that indignation may derive from the perception that the individuals 
involved in the harm were putting profits ahead of human welfare,111 leading to perceptions that 
these were immoral actors.112
                                                          
110 See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . 
., 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631, 641 (1980) ("[People] are more likely to [see an experience as injurious or voice a 
grievance about it] if blame can be placed upon another."). 
 The psychological process of moral blame is a fundamentally 
social process, and our judgments of blame are often attempts to address threats to the social 
order. 
111 See Kahneman and Sunstein, supra note___. 
112 See Reeder et al., supra note___. 
